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Collective Imagination: A Normative Account 
Thomas Szanto 
 
 
 
 
 
1. From social imaginary to collective imagination and back 
 
Imagination is a startling mental capacity, and Sartre was certainly not the first 
who has viewed it as a “magical act” (Sartre 1940, 125). This is not only true of 
the ordinary, individual sort of imagining but especially so of social and collective 
forms of ‘imagining together’. Indeed, it seems mysterious how collectives could 
have proper imaginary representations, their own mental imaginary, or even their 
own faculty of imagination. Or worse, collective imagining may be something that 
is metaphysically outright impossible. And yet, isn’t imagining together a rather 
ordinary phenomenon? As Walton rightly observes, imagining is not always a 
“solitary affair”: we “do not always engage in imaginings alone”; rather, 
“fantasizing is sometimes a social event. There are collaborative daydreams as 
well as private reveries” (Walton 1990, 18). Whether or not it is true that people 
“together may be able to think of more exciting things to imagine than they could 
come up with separately, or more interesting or satisfying ones” (Walton 1990, 
18), collective imagination (CI), rightly construed, is a real phenomenon, or so I 
shall argue.  
 In the face of a veritable industry of philosophical, psychological and 
social-scientific investigations concerning imagination, on the one hand, and an 
equally large literature on collaborative and collective memory (Barnier et al. 
2008; Olick et al. 2011), collective intentionality, agency, mentality (see below) 
and emotions (von Scheve and Salmela 2014), on the other, it is, however, rather 
surprising that hardly anybody has yet systematically addressed the question of 
whether individuals could collectively, or as a group, perform acts of 
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imagination.1 I think one reason for this striking desideratum is that the focus in 
the social sciences has typically been the symbolic or aesthetic content or the public 
display of collective imagination rather than the intentional structure of the act or 
performance of episodes of collective imaginings. Furthermore, psychologists and 
philosophers have been reluctant to account for CI because of the presupposition 
that it would entail some super-individual mental imaginary, or groups with their 
own sensory dimension or phenomenal consciousness. As I shall show in the 
following, however, there is an alternative, normative, construal that is not 
committed to such assumptions, which are indeed implausible, and yet can 
accommodate the typical sensory phenomenology involved in imagination. 
 To be sure, various social facets of imagination have been explored 
extensively in a number of disciplines. Some historical forerunners include 
sociological, psychological, and psychoanalytic discussions of collective 
imaginative representations as conceived, however differently, by Levy-Bruhl, 
Durkheim, Freud, Jung, Vygotsky, or Piaget (cf. Moscovici 1998; Friedland 2005). 
More recently, in the social cognition debate, there has been much work on 
imaginative simulation of others’ mental states, often investigated in tandem with 
pretense (Leslie 1994; Currie 1995; Nichols and Stich 2003; Currie and 
Ravenscroft 2002; Nichols 2006; Goldman 2006; Ingerslev 2014). Meanwhile, a 
roster of sociologists and social philosophers has dwelled upon the concept of 
the social imaginary, a rather vague denominator for a set of beliefs, rules, or pre-
reflective practices pertaining to sociality, or techniques of living together (Taylor 
2004; Adams et al. 2012). Perhaps we find the most influential treatments of 
social imaginary in Castoriadis’ (1975) neo-Marxist conception in his Imaginary 
Institution of Society, Said’s (1978) postcolonial criticism of “imaginary geographies” 
and Anderson’s (1983) famous study on nationalism, Imagined Communities. 
Furthermore, social imaginaries have been specified by sociologists under such 
headings as “interpersonal” and “corporate” emotional imagination (Illouz 2007), 
or in terms of aesthetic and symbolic representation (Bourdieu 1979), and by 
social philosophers and phenomenologists (Ricoeur 1986; Adams 2012; 
Steinbock 2014;). There is also a growing research area in the political sciences on 
various aspects of the so-called “politics of imagination” (Bottici and Challand 
2011) or “imaginal politics” (Bottici 2014), and political philosophers have 
recently started to elaborate on the structure of “institutional imagination” 
(Gledhill 2014).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The only exceptions to my knowledge include the accounts I discuss below, namely Walton’s 
(1990) cursory exposition and the similarly brief and virtually unknown early phenomenological 
accounts of Stein (1922) and Walther (1923), as well as some recent papers by the anthropologist 
Keith Murphy (2004, 2005), who focuses, however, rather narrowly on the creative collaborative 
activity of architectural imagination. 
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 Yet, none of these accounts systematically addresses the issue of how we 
can collectively instantiate acts of imagination, or sufficiently clarify the very 
intentional structure of such acts, however intriguing they are on their own terms. 
Moreover, I contend that we will not make much progress in specifying the 
concept of social imaginary unless we have an account of how collective 
imagination not only relates to, but also differs from, individual imagination. 
Thus, Bottici rightly observes that 
 
if one starts with ‘imagination’, conceived as an individual faculty, then the 
problem is how to account for the at times overwhelming influence of the social 
context. If we begin with the concept of the ‘social imaginary’, then the problem is 
how to reconcile it with the free imagination of individuals. The problem seems 
unsolvable, and […] there is no easy way out. (Bottici 2014, 5) 
 
In the following, I aim to offer some steps towards solving this problem. I will do so 
by outlining what the most plausible and phenomenologically adequate theory of 
imagination requires (sec. 2) and eventually showing how, though CI differs 
markedly from individual imaginings, it can be understood in a way whereby it still 
accommodates all requirements for what counts as imagination proper (sec. 3). I 
conclude by pointing to some desiderata and future research for thinking about the 
social imaginary, namely investigating what exactly happens to our imaginings when 
we, collectively, imagine not just any objects but precisely communities or collectives 
(sec. 4). 
 
2. What is imagination? A primer 
 
Philosophical theories of imagination are as old as philosophical imagination itself. 
From Aristotle onwards, almost all classical authors have tried to account for 
humans’ peculiar capacity to form quasi-perceptual or sensory but also cognitively 
poised and often propositionally structured mental states, which either represent 
something that does not figure as the proper sensory content of one’s own 
perceptual states or beliefs or present something that one takes not to be real (cf. 
Bottici 2014: 15-31; Kind 2016). In the last decades, in the philosophy of mind and 
cognition, imagination has been increasingly dealt with in relation to what is 
sometimes called ‘mental imaginary’ or the role that (sensory) mental images play in 
the content in acts of imagining (Gendler 2011; Thomas 2014; Kind 2015; Gregory 
2016). I will not enter this discussion here but only outline the backbone 
assumptions of a theory of imagination that most contemporary authors can agree 
upon and that seem to be particularly relevant to making the case for CI. I will then 
sketch what I take to be the gist of the phenomenological account of the intentional 
structure of imagination, a feature that will also prove decisive in accommodating the 
collective cases.  
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 A natural way to bring into relief what is distinctive of imagination is to 
contrast it with other mental states that have sensory and intentional content. And 
indeed virtually all authors agree upon what imagination is not: imagination is 
identical with neither conative states that have propositional content, such as desires 
or wishes, nor with propositional attitudes, such as hopes, beliefs, or mere 
suppositions. In contrast to desires and wishes, imagination may, but certainly does 
not necessarily, involve the wish that the imagined object, property, event or state of 
affair be or become real or obtain. Furthermore, desires are typically action-eliciting 
states and, in tandem with certain beliefs about available means and outcomes, they 
constitute reasons for action. Thus, barring certain forms of practical irrationality, 
they also guide our intentional actions. If I desire to go to the cinema, this will 
typically, together with the relevant beliefs about a showing tonight, money, etc., 
make me go to the cinema. Nothing of the like holds for imagining how it would be if 
I went to the cinema. To be sure, this is not to say that imaginings might not shape 
our desires and eventually elicit actions, but there seems to be no essential 
connection between them. Similarly, this is also not to deny the possibility of 
imagined desires or so-called ‘desire-like imaginings’ (Currie 1990; Velleman 2000; 
Doggett and Egan 2007; see also Husserl 1980, 448-455; 539-540), for example when 
I wish that my imagined hero doesn’t die. Such states may have similar action-
eliciting and guiding functions – just within an imaginative or fictional framework – 
as those ordinary imaginings that may add further (phenomenological) force to 
desires by filling out sensory details that merely proposition-like desires or wishes 
lack.2  
 Secondly, imagination must be contrasted with beliefs. There are two related 
features in particular that mark the difference: first, imagination’s spontaneity, 
voluntariness or intentionality and, secondly, its doxastic neutrality. According to the 
standard picture, a distinctive feature of beliefs is that one cannot voluntarily or 
spontaneously form beliefs or decide to believe at will. This has to do with the 
epistemological feature that relates beliefs to truth and evidence. Beliefs only occur if 
the believer has some evidence that warrants her belief. Another common way to put 
this is to say that beliefs aim at truth (Williams 1973; Cohen 1989; cf. Velleman 
2000). If one believes that p, one typically takes p to be true. This is quite unlike 
imagination. As we will see in more detail, imaginings are characterized by specific 
doxastic modifications. If one imagines p, one either takes p as fictional, possible, 
non-existent, absent, or make-believe, or pretends that p, while knowing that p 
actually might not obtain. Moreover, imaginings are characterized by a peculiar 
spontaneity – they often arise ‘out of the blue’ (cf. Casey 2000, 63-72). Again, this is 
not to say that there are no belief-like imaginings just as there are desire-like ones. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Closely related cases are discussed by Gendler (2006a) in terms of “imaginative contagion”, the 
phenomenon whereby “merely imagining or pretending that P has effects that we would expect 
only perceiving or believing that P to have” (Gendler 2006a, 184), for example, “when imagining 
a vacation may make us more eager to take one.” 
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Yet, whereas one takes beliefs in belief-like imagination to be true only in the 
imagined, possible, or fictional world of imagination, barring unusual cases or on 
pain of irrationality, one takes ordinary beliefs to be true not only in some possible 
but in the actual world (cf. Gendler 2011).  
 This brings us to the third contrast-state: imagining p must be distinguished 
from merely supposing that p or entertaining some other propositional attitude 
towards the mere possibility or conceivability of p, or counterfactual reasoning. This 
has to do not so much with the epistemology but rather with the sensory or 
representational phenomenology of episodes of imagination. Imaginings have, along 
with their more or less rich imagistic and cognitive content (cf. Lagland-Hassan 
2015), a specific sort of sensory or intuitive content, which brings them closer to 
perception than to any other mental act. Indeed, however difficult it is to bring out 
the difference in the sensory phenomenology of imagination (cf. Casey 2000), there 
is a clear sense in which to imagine something has an intuitively richer and more 
‘striking’ content. Imagining p concerns or impacts and often emotionally affects us 
more forcefully than merely supposing p or pondering its conceivability or normative 
implications. As Moran nicely puts it:  
 
imagining […] involves something more like genuine rehearsal, ‘trying on’ the 
point of view, trying to determine what it is like to inhabit it. It is something I may 
not be able to do if my heart is not in it. (Compare this with ordinary 
counterfactual reasoning, which is considerably less topic-specific or dependent on 
moods.) If we understood better why imagining […] requires your heart to be in 
it, we would understand better what is being resisted when we resist. (Moran 1994, 
105) 
 
Thus, the idea that the phenomenology of imagination involves personal concerns or 
an affective dimension in a way in which mere suppositions do not leads to an 
intriguing puzzle, first pointed out by Hume (1757; cf. Gendler 2006b) and recently 
much debated under the heading of ‘imaginative resistance’ (Walton 1994, 2006; 
Gendler 2000, 2006b; Weatherson 2004; Stueber 2011).3 The idea is this: assuming 
that our imaginings carry some affective weight or affect us personally, imagination 
seems to be bound by what we are emotionally capable of or willing to picture. This 
becomes particularly salient when considering fictional or aesthetic contexts. We 
seem to have an intuitive resistance to even ‘just’ imagining scenarios involving some 
blatantly morally wrong outcomes. Sometimes this is the case even if what is at stake 
is only to imaginatively dwell upon scenarios that directly violate deeply ingrained 
conventions. For example, it seems difficult to engage with fiction or art that clearly 
violates our moral sense regarding violence against children or racism. Or think of 
pornography, even if it is within the bounds of legality. Surely, what is and what is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Interestingly, there is an early formulation of this phenomenon also in Husserl where he 
discusses the impossibility of imagining oneself commit a murder; see Husserl (1952, 264-265, 
331). 
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not permissible in the domain of imagination is socio-culturally and historically 
relative. But the very fact that there is a need to publicly negotiate and gauge norms 
limiting not just our publicly available artistic representations but also our mental 
imaginary ‘for private use’ shows over and over again that such intuitions regarding 
what is better not to imagine are a real fact of human (moral) psychology.  
 But where is the puzzle or paradox here? In order to see the point, consider 
again the possible lack of wishes and desires in and the doxastic neutrality of 
imagination. Given that, in imagining p, one not only invests no belief in p but 
doesn’t even necessarily wish that p, it is indeed puzzling why one would still feel any 
resistance to imagining p. We often say, ‘It’s just fiction’, and commonly accept that 
one may imagine whatever one likes as long as one doesn’t act upon it. Yet, we 
cannot accept such conciliatory reassurances if our sensory imaginary, our affective 
investment in it and our moral sense clash. And it is precisely this paradox that 
illuminates the difference between imagination and mere suppositions, possibilities 
and counterfactual reasoning. After all, there seems nothing wrong in merely 
supposing, for the sake of an argument for a better society for example, what it 
would mean to euthanize handicapped individuals unfit to work. Yet, the same 
cannot be said if we imagine what such a society would be like, or how it would be to 
live in such a society. In this latter case, we seem to immediately feel some resistance 
in performing the imagining. Now, crucially, this normative dimension of 
imagination, indicated by the phenomenon of imaginative resistance, is not restricted 
to fictional scenarios. Rather, as I shall argue in the next section, it is a distinctive 
feature of collective imagination, where normative pressures on (individuals’) mental 
imaginary are considerably more forceful than in individual cases. 
 Before moving to the collective cases, however, we need a firmer grasp of the 
intentionality of imagination. This is best provided by the phenomenological theory of 
imagination as proposed by authors such as Husserl (esp. 1980), Fink (1930), Sartre 
(1936, 1940), or more recently Casey (2000). However much they differ on a number 
of specific claims regarding, for example, the ontology of objects of imagination, 
their being posited as nothingness (Sartre 1936, 1940), or their perspectival (Husserl 
1980) or non-perspectival givenness (Sartre 1940),4 when it comes to the intentional 
structure of episodes of imagination, by and large all phenomenologists agree upon 
four claims:  
 (1) First, phenomenologists accept the already familiar claim that engaging in 
acts of imagination is an intentional conscious mental act that is under (relative) 
deliberate control of the subject of imagination (e.g., Husserl 1980, 2-4; Sartre 1940).  
 (2) More importantly, acts of imagination are, precisely as conscious mental 
acts, intentional in a more pregnant phenomenological sense: they are characterized, 
just like any other conscious acts – be they perceptions, beliefs, hopes, doubts, 
memories, expectations or volitions – by their intentional directedness to given 
objects, persons, events, or states of affairs. This is worth emphasizing, for it may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 I cannot dwell on these differences in any detail here; see Casey (2000) and Stawarska (2005). 
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seem that the peculiar nature of imagination would make its objects somehow 
different from ordinary objects of, for example, perception. However, it is a key 
contention of every phenomenological account that, wherever we may locate the 
difference, it certainly is not regarding the objectivity of objects of imagination: 
imagination has its intentional objects just like any other mental act.  
 (3) Similarly, the distinctive feature of imagination, in particular compared to 
perception, is not that the perception has and imagination lacks genuinely sensory – 
or in phenomenological jargon, so-called hyletic – content. To be sure, there are 
indeed some important differences between the two ‘sensory’ acts; these especially 
concern: (a) the activity of perceptual and imaginary projects (perception, for 
example, is linked to bodily or kinesthetic activities in a way imagination is not); (b) 
spontaneity and control (similar to judgments, perceptions are co-dependent on what 
the world contributes, whereas imaginings are obviously not determined in the same 
way); and (c) objectual determinacy (the imagistic presentation of imagined objects or 
events may be almost infinitely fine-grained, whereas perceptual objects will always 
have some yet undetermined horizons, which are not given in perception; at the 
same time objects of imagination will typically lack the sensory ‘presence’ of directly 
perceived objects).5 
 These differences from perception notwithstanding, imagination is usually 
taken to exhibit a ‘quasi-perceptual’ content and phenomenal quality.6 Indeed, one of 
the crucial contentions of the phenomenological account of imagination is that we 
must safeguard the ‘imagistic’, sensory or quasi-perceptual dimension of imagination 
(Husserl 1980, 219, 227, 349-351; cf. Elliott 2005; Jansen 2005, 2016).7 Speaking with 
Kind (2001), phenomenologists ‘put the image back into imagination’, but they also 
lay stress on the fact that acts of imagining exhibit (quasi-perceptual) sensory and 
phenomenal contents. In order to avoid misunderstandings, for Husserl, as for other 
phenomenologists, imagination is not derived from perception or from what Husserl 
calls “image consciousness” [Bildbewusstsein], the awareness of an image qua image 
representing something (cf. Aldea 2013). Rather, it is a distinct intentional act, an 
irreducible capacity of our mental lives. And just as perception puts the perceiver in 
direct touch with the perceived objects, without any further mediation of mental 
representations or other peculiar mental ‘items’ (see Szanto 2012), imagination does 
the same with the imagined objects. Though imagination has some imagistic and 
sensory dimension, Husserl clearly rejects the view that there are some mediating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Notice that none of this is meant to imply that either is phenomenally richer than the other, but 
rather simply to point to some differences in their phenomenal givenness. 
6  However, as Gendler (2011) notes, some distinguish between perception-like and belief-like 
imaginings, the first involving mental images and sensory qualities, the latter being propositional 
and amounting to cognitively entertaining a possibility (e.g., Currie and Ravenscroft 2002).  
7 However, phenomenologists clearly distinguish between material ‘physical images’ and psychic 
images or ‘phantasy presentation’; see e.g. Husserl (1980, 17-30, 47-65; cf. Aldea 2013) and Sartre 
(1940). 
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mental images in imagination (phantasma or the like). On the contrary, “imagining is a 
direct sensory awareness of objects” (Jansen 2016, 71). 
 (4) Now, the central difference between imagination and different but cogent 
mental states lies not in the differences between their contents or objects, but rather 
concerns a distinctive intentional mode, or in phenomenological terms, the ‘thetic’ or 
‘positional quality’ of acts of imagination. Thus, it concerns what we have already 
encountered in terms of doxastic neutrality and which Husserl discusses in terms of 
“qualitative” or “imaginative modification” (e.g., Husserl 1980, 335-343, 355-361): 
“phantasy is precisely through and through modification” (Husserl 1980, 326).  
But Husserl is far more differentiated than contemporary accounts trading on the 
doxastic modification involved in imagination. Phenomenologically viewed, the 
modification in imagination is twofold: it concerns, on the one hand, the mode of 
representation of the intentional act and, on the other hand, its doxastic or thetic 
character. The imaginative modification concerns, first, a modification, noematically 
speaking, in the way objects appear, namely as an as-if object, and, viewed noetically, 
in the way objects are presented or given, namely presentified. But this modification 
in the representational character of the act and object of imagination is correlated to 
another dimension of intentional modification, which has not so much to do with 
the representational but rather the epistemological or doxastic features of 
imaginings.8 Whereas perception “presents” the object “in person [leibhaftig], as it 
were, as present itself […], in phantasy […], the object itself appears […], but it does 
not appear as present [gegenwärtig]. It is only presentified [vergegenwärtigt]. It appears as 
if it were there but only as if” (Husserl 1980, 16; transl. modified). Accordingly, in 
imagination “I construct the as-if-object in the manner of an original quasi-
perceptual as-if-giving of the object itself [quasi wahrnehmungsmäßige Selbstgebung-als-ob]” 
(Husserl 1980, 696).  
 More precisely, objects of imagination can be presentified in four different 
ways, according to four distinct ways they are posited: (i) as non-existent, as in 
fiction; (ii) as absent or non-actual [in-aktuell], or existing elsewhere in time and/or 
space, for example when you imagine what a non-fictional person does when she is 
absent or did when she was still alive; (iii) as irreal, or existentially neutral, i.e. given 
doxastic modification of the object which posits it as neither existent nor non-
existent but rather neutralizes any existential claim regarding it; (iv) finally, there is an 
indeed pervasive thetic modification of objects as pure possibilities. As Casey (1971) 
argues against Husserl and Sartre, pure possibility is beyond neutrality, reality and 
unreality, and cannot be explained in terms of any of these modifications.9 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This is certainly not to imply that there were two distinct modifications in acts of imagination. 
Rather, they are but two correlative aspects of one and the same phenomenon. 
9 Indeed, Casey argues that this is the single crucial thetic modification that characterizes “all 
prototypical imagining” and lends imagined objects an “existential status of [their] own” (Casey 
1971, 478). However, I do not think that every proper imagining necessarily and exclusively 
involves this modification. For, why shouldn’t it be a proper imagination if one posits the 
imagined object as inexistent, non-actual or absent and thus here and now not possible? 
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 It is crucial to distinguish these modes, all the more so as these distinctions 
often get confused in lay-accounts of imagination and are rarely properly 
distinguished in standard philosophical accounts. Moreover, distinguishing non-
existence from non-actuality, irreality, and pure possibility makes it clear that 
imagination stands in no exclusive relation to inexistent or fictional objects. In other 
words, “imagining does not involve a relation to objects of a special ontological 
category, e.g., nonexistent or fictional objects, but rather involves a particular mode 
of relating to objects” (Jansen 2016, 71).  
 
3. The possibility and structure of collective imagination  
 
Now that we have an initial understanding of what imagination is, it will surely seem 
that such mental episodes can only be instantiated by individuals and hence CI is 
impossible. After all, how could such episodes be shared, given that imagination was 
characterized as a spontaneous mental act under deliberative control and involving a 
sensory phenomenology? It might seem that we would need a bullet way too large to 
bite in order to accommodate shared imaginative episodes. Specifically, it might seem 
that we would need to assume not just collective mentality or a group mind with its 
own deliberative mechanisms and capability for mental representation or imaginary; 
for, even if one were to grant this possibility (Huebner 2014; Szanto 2014) – a 
possibility that many surely will resist – it might seem that we would need further 
assumptions. We would need to assume that collectives engaging in joint imaginative 
episodes would have their own sensory phenomenology.10 As I shall argue in this 
section, however, we need no such extreme and indeed implausible assumptions to 
defend CI.  
 But before defending my own account, let’s have a look at one of the first, 
still rather sketchy but no less interesting philosophical proposals put forth by 
Walton in his book Mimesis as Make-Believe. It is worth quoting the relevant passage at 
length:  
 
The social activity I call collective imagining involves more than mere 
correspondence in what is imagined. Not only do the various participants 
imagine many of the same things; each of them realizes that the others are 
imagining what he is, and each realizes that the others realize this. Moreover, 
steps are taken to see that the correspondence obtains. And each participant has 
reasonable expectations and can make justified predictions about what others 
will imagine, given certain turns of events. Making explicit agreements about 
what to imagine […] is one method of coordinating imaginings. But it has a 
serious drawback. Insofar as the participants decide, collectively, on what to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Notice that this is not the same as assuming the possibility of affective or emotional sharing—
which is a still contentious, to be sure, but increasingly accepted assumption; see, e.g., von Scheve 
& Salmela 2014. I have argued for emotional sharing elsewhere: Szanto (2015), Szanto 
(forthcoming), and León et al. (forthcoming). 
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imagine, their imaginings are bound to be deliberate; each must decide, 
individually, to imagine whatever it is that is agreed upon. The price of 
coordination by agreement is the ‘vivacity’ of imagining spontaneously. But […] 
coordination can be effected by other means without paying this price – by 
enlisting the aid of such things as doll, hobbyhorses, snow forts, toy trucks, mud 
pies, and representational works of art. (Walton 1990, 18-19) 
 
Walton is perfectly right in distinguishing “mere correspondence in what is 
imagined” and genuine sharing of imaginative episodes; and he is also on the right 
track in pointing to the following criteria constitutive of this difference (notably 
criteria that are usually viewed as constitutive of other forms of intentional and 
affective sharing; cf. Szanto 2015, 2016, forthcoming): (i) sameness of the intentional 
object; (ii) some form of mutual awareness (or ‘realization’) of others partaking in the 
joint imaginative activity, and (iii) some form of deliberate coordination or agreement 
on how to proceed. 
 Walton is also right in emphasizing the role of those aids that he later 
discusses as ‘prompters’. Prompters can be any natural or cultural artefacts (e.g., the 
above-mentioned dolls, hobbyhorses, snow forts, etc., but also hallucinogenic drugs) 
that help ‘broaden’ our imaginative capabilities, for example by spontaneously 
imagining things we might not readily imagine without them. Importantly for present 
purposes, prompters are often artificially produced not just to induce private 
imaginative musings but precisely to facilitate spontaneous engagement in collective 
imaginative projects. They do so not least by smoothly “direct[ing] the imaginings of 
others in predetermined ways” (Walton 1990, 22). Finally, prompters may become 
conventionalized, habitualized, or internalized. This is particularly familiar from 
artistic traditions or rituals, but Walton gives a simpler example: “With practice 
[participants] may ‘internalize’ this convention sufficiently so that when they see a 
stump, even a not very bear-like one, it provokes them automatically and 
unreflectively to imagine a bear” (Walton 1990, 24). Prompters are particularly 
interesting with regard to CI because they help coordinate imaginings or make 
agreements on how to proceed more spontaneously than do discursive frameworks. 
Prompters facilitate, coordinate and guide our joint imaginative projects without 
complicated and often “disruptive discussions”, explicit stipulations or lengthy 
collective deliberations (Walton 1990, 23).  
 So far, so good. But are the above-mentioned criteria, plus the facilitating role 
of prompters, really sufficient for “shar[ing] our imaginative thoughts with others” 
(Walton 1990, 22)? I contend that more is needed. What then makes it the case that 
some instances of imagination are not simply instances of a subject S1 imagining I 
and a subject S2 (and S3…Sn) also imagining I but, rather, S1 and S2 imagining I 
together or collectively imagining I – i.e., properly speaking, sharing imaginings? Upon 
closer scrutiny, there are two interrelated questions involved here. First, what 
distinguishes individual or solitary imaginings from a simple aggregation of separate 
individual ones and furthermore from a genuinely collective one: is it differences 
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between the objects, the representational qualities or contents, the spontaneity or 
vividness of imagining, or something else? Secondly, what constitutes the sharedness 
or collectivity of CI: is it the object, the sensory contents, the subject or something 
else? 
 In order to address these questions it is useful to take a look at the 
burgeoning literature on collective intentionality. Within this debate, it has become 
customary to distinguish three types of accounts of what constitutes the sharedness 
or collectivity of collective intentionality. They are distinguished according to which 
of the three core aspects of intentional acts – their content or object, their mode, or their 
subject – one assigns the collectivity-constituting function. As Schweikard and Schmid 
aptly summarize:  
 
Content-accounts claim that for A and B’s intention to visit the Taj Mahal 
tomorrow to be collective, each A and B have to intend to visit the Taj Mahal 
together. Mode-accounts insist that the element of collectivity has to extend to 
the intending; in their view, A and B have to intend collectively to visit the Taj 
Mahal (together). Subject-accounts claim that the element of togetherness is 
really in the subject; in their view, A and B have to form a plural subject or a 
unified group that is the subject of – and has – the intention to visit the Taj 
Mahal. (Schweikard and Schmid 2013)11 
 
Given these standard distinctions, there are the following options of where to ‘tie in’ 
the sharedness of imaginings in CI: 
(i) Sharedness, as we have already seen with Walton, might be constituted by the fact 
that participants are directed to the same imagined intentional object (or event, person, 
state of affairs, etc.). This will also involve sameness of the presentified contents and 
possibly that of the vehicles presenting them (e.g., same symbolic or imagistic media or 
prompters).  
 (ii) Secondly, it might be due to the specific mode in which each of us intends 
the given object, or in Searlean terms (1995; 2010) a ‘we-intention’. Instead of you 
and me imagining something in the ‘I-mode’, you and I will ‘we-imagine’. Notice that 
we do not necessarily need a plural subject here (as in (iii) below) who instantiates 
we-imaginings. It would suffice if individual intentions of the form ‘I we-intend’, ‘you 
we-intend’, etc. were sufficiently integrated. The collectivity would be built into the 
very way we imaginatively refer to or intend the given object, an object that according 
to (i) might already be shared. 
 The notion of mode here should not be confused with the modification of 
the positional quality of acts of imagination mentioned above. Still, regarding the 
doxastic mode, one might hold that it must also be identical across subjects in CI. 
According to this line of thought, it will not be enough that one subject imagines an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 A prototypical representative of the content-account is Bratman (2014), while Searle (1995, 
2010) and Tuomela (2007) defend different versions of the mode-account and Gilbert (1989), 
Rovane (1998) or Tollefsen (2015) offer variants of the subject-account. 
	   12 
object as absent, while another imagines it as fictional or inexistent and a third 
remains neutral towards its existence. Rather, the specific modification of the 
positional thesis must also be identical. 
 (iii) According to probably the most robust, but certainly also the most 
demanding, account, subjects would need to constitute their own group mind or 
plural subject, which would eventually be the bearer of acts of collective imagination. 
On the face of it, this sounds mysterious and metaphysically unnecessarily inflated. 
Following the most plausible plural subject accounts of collective intentionality 
(Gilbert 1989), however, what the individuals would need to do here is not really 
mysterious. They need to jointly commit themselves to imagining something as one mind. 
This entails, roughly, that none of the parties could individually and without further 
ado (e.g., without discussing it with the others) withdraw at will from the joint 
imaginative project. The joint commitment to the shared project could only be 
obliterated jointly. 
 So which of these requirements is constitutive of CI? I want to argue that we 
can only properly account for CI if we endorse a multi-dimensional picture. 
According to this, the sharedness of imaginative episodes across subjects is – above 
and beyond Walton’s mutual realization criterion – constituted by the first two of the 
above requirements for sharedness (i.e., sameness of object of imagination and 
representational contents, possibly but not necessarily sameness of vehicles of 
imaginative representation and sameness of intentional mode and thetic quality), but 
also retains some elements of the third. In particular, I contend that we can retain its 
normative spirit, which is captured by the emphasis on joint commitments. However, 
we ought to skip any reference to plural subjects or unified group minds, which, for 
some, might be too heavy a metaphysical burden.  
 (iv) What I suggest then is a further, and indeed crucial, constitutive element 
for sharedness of imaginings – one that is typically left out of the ‘collectivity 
equation’ in general – namely a normative one. Drawing on Edith Stein’s ingenious 
early phenomenological proposal, I want to argue that both a decisive difference 
between individual and collective imaginings and a key to understanding the 
constitution of CI lies in the degree of normativity that is built into, guides and 
ultimately integrates individuals’ imaginative projects. The proposal is that it is the 
high degree of normativity involved in CI that unifies individuals’ imaginings and 
makes them eventually exhibit group-relative ‘imagistic typologies’.  
 To be sure, norms guide what to and what not to imagine in any act of 
imagination, be it solitary or not. And this is precisely what explains the emergence 
of the phenomenon of imaginative resistance discussed above. But there are 
important differences between the norms regulating solitary and joint imaginative 
projects. The differences concern the normative powers and, as we shall see in a 
moment, also the very way in which norms regulate imaginations. Concerning 
normative power, the constitution and the success of CI will to a much larger degree 
depend upon the way in which the participants’ presentational capacities comply with 
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what their group takes to be essential features of the imagined object. If my 
imaginative intentional fulfillment falls all too short of what my ‘fellow imaginers’ 
require, I will no longer participate in the joint imagination, even if others or I myself 
fail to realize that.12 The reason for this is that the imagined object or world is 
supposed to be precisely not my own imaginative representation but our common one 
and must consequently respond to shared norms, values or commitments. And this is 
also the reason why each of us is entitled to (re-)claim our imaginative typologies if 
they are violated by our fellow imaginers – even if we know full well that in 
imagination there are no objective facts of the matter as to the representational 
properties of a given object.  
 Notice that the normativity in question works similar to Walton’s 
conventionalized and internalized prompters. And indeed, norms of CI will typically 
be created and maintained by means of symbolic or artistic prompters, such as 
mythologies, fairy-tale figures, literature, paintings, or architecture. However, again, 
the normative force of such collective prompters on individuals’ imaginings is 
typically much wider in scope and diachronically more robust than those of 
individual prompters, such as private sketches, toys for individual use, etc. The 
former may often exert their influence on very large collectives and over generations 
(ethnic or religious communities, etc.). Here is how Stein puts it: 
 
we all also know a fantasy world that we consider to be a common property 
[Gemeingut]: Sleeping Beauty and Little Red Riding Hood are figures of the 
German fairy-tale world, which belongs to the collective environment of our 
nation. It wouldn’t occur to anyone among us to maintain that everyone has his 
or her own Sleeping Beauty. Sleeping Beauty has her own securely defined traits 
[…]. We would lodge a very forceful protest if somebody wanted to attribute 
traits to her that don’t belong to her. Now, our fairy-tale world has a certain 
typology, a distinctiveness that distinguishes it from those of other nations, for 
example the Chinese. (Stein 1922, 147-148; transl. modified) 
 
Interestingly, Stein’s claim has recently gained empirical credit from developmental 
psychologists. Rakoczy and colleagues demonstrated in a series of studies that 3-year-
olds have a context-sensitive understanding and enforcement of normative rules in 
joint pretense plays (‘Let’s say that the soap is a loaf of bread in this game’). Children 
forcefully protest if other participants (another child or adult) or even fictional 
characters (e.g., a teddy-bear) who join the game treat target objects according to 
their real function (e.g., as soap) or mix up pretended identities between different 
games. Thus, the studies clearly indicate that children’s learning of the distinction 
between pretense or fictional scenarios and reality is normative through and through 
(Rakoczy 2008; Wyman et al. 2009). Moreover, it has been suggested that, from an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 I have argued for a similar, essentially normative component in the constitution of collective 
emotions in Szanto (2015). There, I have also discussed in detail various types of 
misidentification regarding one’s group-membership. 
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ontogenetic perspective, this understanding lies at the basis of eventually engaging in 
collective intentionality and complex institutional frameworks (Tomasello 2014). 
Those are construed in Searlean terms as the collective assignment of specific 
(normative) status function (‘X counts as Y in context C’) and its collective 
acceptance (‘This piece of paper is a dollar in the US’; cf. Searle 1995, 2010).  
 Now, critics may object that, though there may be differences in the degree of 
the normative powers, given that normativity is involved in solitary as well as 
collective imagination, normativity cannot constitute the decisive difference. Rather, 
as the objection might proceed, collective acceptance of what counts as what in the 
imagined world would suffice. However, an account of CI based on collective 
acceptance will ultimately fail. First and foremost, collective acceptance depends 
upon linguistic or some form of discursive negotiation, but we often engage in joint 
imaginative projects without such negotiation. As we have seen, collective acceptance 
– or in Walton’s terms, CI by agreement – fails to explain how we can engage in CI 
spontaneously, without complex discursive coordination, thus forfeiting the potential 
vivacity of imaginings. In contrast, norms can be internalized and habitualized such 
that they can ‘kick in’ spontaneously whenever individuals engage in CI. Also, norms 
can be ‘sedimented’ in collective prompters in a much more robust way than can 
explicit agreements, which often require constant and explicit reaffirmation to be 
upheld. Thus, sedimented norms more “securely define” the properties of imagined 
objects than the mere collective acceptance of, say, what representational contents 
the concept of a Sleeping Beauty entails. There are two further problems with a 
collective acceptance account of CI: first, acceptance is an all-or-nothing affair. But 
CI, as we shall see in a moment, admits of fine-grained differences in the sensory 
phenomenology across the participants. I can fill or leave out certain representational 
properties of a Sleeping Beauty, while still imaginatively referring to the same 
(shared) object as others. Habitualized norms can regulate this without complicated 
agreements concerning the exact properties of Sleeping Beauties. Secondly, 
acceptance is much more clearly context bound than norms, which typically admit a 
wider scope and higher flexibility in application. While we collectively accept that X 
counts as Y in a specific context C, norms can apply across a range of different 
contexts and thus much more flexibly regulate what is still, say, ‘pretty much like our 
Sleeping Beauty’. 
 But does this mean that norms of imagination even regulate the fine-grained 
sensory phenomenology of CI? Recall that it is precisely this aspect of imagination that 
prima facie makes collective imagination impossible. For, it might seem that, for CI 
to work, given the phenomenology of imagination, we would need to assume not just 
a group mind with its own mental imaginary, but also a group mind with its own 
sensory phenomenology. But we do not need to assume this. To see why, notice 
again that CI admits of differences in the sensory phenomenology across 
participants, who may refer to the same intentional object with different intuitive 
contents. Accordingly and following once more the lead of early phenomenologists, 
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we have to distinguish two aspects in the structure of CI: its intuitive or phenomenal and 
its intentional components. As Stein suggests: 
 
Thus, apparently we are faced with an antinomy. On the one hand, fantasy and 
fantasy world give themselves as simply private and relative to the single subject; 
on the other hand, as super-individual. Perhaps we can arrive at a solution of the 
antinomy if we distinguish between fantasy-intention [Phantasie-Intention] and 
fantasy-intuition [Phantasie-Anschauung]. We all intend [meinen] the same object 
when we speak of Sleeping Beauty’s castle. But if each of us intuitively represents 
it [veranschaulichen], then we have just as many intuitive objects [anschauliche 
Objekte] as intuiting subjects. Fantasy intuition doesn't bring the meant object 
itself before our eyes like perception, but merely represents it; and everybody 
represents it in his or her own way. (Stein 1922, 147-148) 
 
Given this distinction, some may wonder, however, whether it entails a duplication 
of intentional objects. Every instance of CI would then entail both a shared 
intentional object and a collection of private intuitive objects. But this cannot be 
right. First, this would not only be ontologically unparsimonious but, moreover, it 
would blatantly violate the phenomenological insight that, in intentional acts, we are 
not directed at some intermediary objects or contents but, rather, directly at the 
respective intentional object. Furthermore, since intentional acts are individuated (in 
part) by their intentional objects, every instance of CI would then have two 
intentional acts, a private (intuitive) and a shared (non-intuitive?) one. Finally, how to 
construe the relation between the two objects would be mysterious (as constitutive, 
foundational, or something else?), and we would still be left with the puzzle of how 
an aggregation of private intuitive objects could ever be integrated such that we 
would (also?) have a shared intentional one.  
 Yet, luckily there is a more charitable reading of Stein. According to this, we 
do not have two literally separate intentional objects but, rather, only two aspects of 
the collective intentionality involved in CI. These aspects may but need not in fact 
coincide and can, in any case, be conceptually distinguished. We can find a somewhat 
clearer expression of such a double-aspect theory of CI in Gerda Walther’s congenial 
account of experiential sharing (see Szanto forthcoming) in a passage where she 
discusses the possibility of communities directed at imaginary objects. In a 
remarkably similar vein to Stein, Walther distinguishes between the shared 
intentional object of a collective imagination and those (noematic) contents that need 
not be shared or even be similar across the participants, notably the intuitive and 
emotional ones: 
 
Let’s suppose that a number of children feign [fingieren sich] a benevolent fairy in a 
play and build her a temple such that they pay homage to her in their well-
organised play. They constitute a community ‘in the service’ [“im Dienste”] of this 
fairy. Here, the intentional object of this communal life (i.e. the life in the service 
of this fairy) certainly is no real object, nor is it intended as such, for the children 
know in fact very well that their fairy does not exist in reality, rather they just 
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pretend thus. What is real is only the behavior of the children in the service of the 
fairy […] Moreover, the noema […], through which the same intended object is 
intended, that is, the same ‘content’ of the psychic life [Seelenleben] of the members, 
needs not be the same, let alone identical. […] Rather […] the emotional 
accentuation [Gefühlsbetonung] and the intuition in the imagination [Anschaulichkeit in 
der Vorstellung] of the fairy might be wholly different for the different children. 
(Walther 1923, 25-26) 
 
However, while I agree with Stein and Walther that we need to carefully distinguish 
the intentional from the phenomenal, sensory or intuitive aspects of acts of CI, I 
believe that differences in the latter will not be as significant as they suggest but, 
rather, much more fine-grained. At the same time, differences will also be less 
subject-relative than Stein and Walther think. This is due to the robust normativity 
involved in CI. To be sure, norms of imagining do not determine the fine-grained 
sensory phenomenology of imaginings. If the phenomenon of imaginative resistance 
is real, even our solitary imaginings are shaped by norms, and we often resist filling 
out mere suppositions with imaginary and sensory detail. But given the bigger risk of 
exclusion from our fellow imaginers, this is to a considerably larger extent so in the 
social arena – unless, of course, we are artists, trying to collectively push the 
boundaries of what and how to imagine. Thus, our very phenomenology of CI, the 
‘how’ we (ought to) imagine something, is deeply penetrated and modulated by social 
norms, and especially so since these norms often become internalized and 
habitualized and hence even work without our deliberate or conscious endorsement. 
 
4. Concluding remarks: From collective imagination to imagining collectives 
 
Let me draw these lines together and conclude by pointing to a desideratum and 
possible avenues for future research. The guiding question I have investigated in this 
paper is whether and how it is possible that two or more individuals properly 
speaking share episodes of imagination, a phenomenon I have called, in 
contradistinction to social imagination and social imaginary, collective imagination.  
 The question of whether CI is possible in the first place has presented itself 
especially with regard to a particular feature of (individual) imagination, namely its 
specific sensory phenomenology. After all, how can a group of individuals share 
intentional acts, not only with their own mode, content and object but also with their 
own sensory contents or phenomenal qualities, to wit, without presupposing some 
arguably mysterious phenomenal group consciousness? I have tried to show that we 
can circumvent this problem by referring to a double-aspect theory of collective 
imagination and distinguishing shared intentional aspects from the phenomenal, 
sensory or intuitive aspects of CI.  
 In addressing the question of how to account for instances of CI, I have 
focused on the correlative questions of what is distinctive of CI in comparison to 
individual imaginings and what constitutes the collectivity in CI. I have argued that 
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the standard picture of CI, exemplified by Walton’s account, needs some corrections 
and amendments, and suggested a multi-dimensional and normative account. Beyond 
or instead of Walton’s requirements – viz. shared objects, mutual awareness, 
coordination or agreement and the role of so-called promoters in the latter – I have 
proposed that CI constitutively involves the following: (i) sharedness of objects and 
contents and typically that of the vehicles and prompters, (ii) sharedness of the 
intentional mode and the specific thetic quality of the acts (i.e., taking the imagined 
object as fictional, non-existent, possible, etc.) and, crucially, (iii) specific and 
specifically strong normative constraints on what and how to imagine together. 
Furthermore, reflecting on the intriguing phenomenon of imaginative resistance, I 
have emphasized that norms of imagination, often internalized and habitualized, 
modulate CI even more robustly than individual imaginings.  
 Now, it is also these criteria that mark the difference between individual and 
collective imaginings, and neither differences between certain types of imaginary 
objects (say ‘ordinary’ phantasma versus socio-cultural constructs of a social 
imaginary) – as some work in the social sciences might suggest – nor differences in 
the vehicles of solitary and collective imaginings (say more or less symbolic or 
imagistic versus discursive) and respective differences in their representational 
qualities, vividness or spontaneity. 
 But what about the mutual awareness or, as Walton puts it, ‘realization’ 
requirement? Is it really necessary for all types of CI, and does it have to be some 
direct, face-to-face or perceptual form of mutual awareness? And if so, would it not 
be an all too strong requirement for all varieties of CI, excluding some genuinely 
collective imaginings for the wrong reasons (such as the example of the shared fairy 
tale world across generations)?13 Indeed, I believe that in a fully comprehensive 
account of CI – one that goes far beyond the present proposal – we must distinguish 
different types of the genera of CI. These then would in part be distinguished 
precisely by whether they necessarily involve direct mutual awareness or rather some 
technologically, discursively, or symbolically mediated, non-direct and possibly non-
synchronous ways of knowing each other as participants in a collaborative 
imaginative project. I am thinking here for example of distinguishing types of CI 
according to their different objects (e.g., artistic artefacts, fairy tale worlds, rituals, 
political imaginaries) and the different collectives and creative processes involved: for 
example architectural teams in collaborative creative practices, or brainstorming (cf. 
Murphy 2004, 2005); socio-cultural collectives with robust shared practices and 
values, engaging in the imaginary creation of fictional traditions, fairy tale worlds, 
rituals, etc.; or forms of social imaginary proper, which could be instantiated by 
single individuals, with a ‘group in mind’, and involve the imaginary creations of a 
shared past (collective memory), utopian thinking, etc. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  See my discussion of this requirement regarding collective emotions and my respective 
proposal to distinguish different types of emotional sharing in Szanto (2015 and forthcoming). 
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 But there will be another crucial difference between these types – and this 
constitutes another important desideratum for a comprehensive account of CI. It 
seems that in some varieties, and especially so in social imaginaries, we can observe a 
certain blurring of the conative and the representational-imaginative aspects. Thus, 
the boundary that usually marks off imaginings from mere desires and wishes 
typically becomes porous in these latter forms of heavily mediated, symbolically and 
discursively laden social imaginaries. But it is not at all clear why, when we 
collectively imagine, we often (co-)imagine collectives to which we either wish to 
belong or have belonged, or regarding which we wish that certain facts obtain. 
Future research should consequently investigate the specific socio-psychological 
mechanism leading to such blurring of wishes and imaginings. I conjecture that 
familiar social-identification mechanisms or in-group favoritism will play a key role. I 
suppose also that the intriguing phenomenon of collective iteration of imagined 
scenarios, or the so-called ‘collapsed imagination’ (i.e. simulating or imagining others’ 
imaginations; Currie 1995; Nichols 2003), might be at play here. But whatever the 
reasons, it seems that the step from collective imagination to imagining collectives 
that we wish to belong to and to be a certain way is often a small and often 
dangerous one.  
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